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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 34TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP (AMGS) [U]
APO US Forces 96307

AND

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B (11) 15 May 66

SUBJECT: Operational Report, _____ for Period Ending 30 Apr 66.
April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 RT)

(12) 46p.

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THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO US Forces 96307

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TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
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Washington, D. C.

gpt

FILE COPY

1. Under the provisions of AR 525-2, and USARV Circular Number 870-1, dated 11 November 1965, with change 1 dated 1 April 1966, the following report is submitted in two sections. The time period of this report is from 24 November 1965 - 30 April 1966.

SECTION I

2. In order to provide a clear understanding of the 34th Group and how it came about, this section is divided into two phases of time: the status of units and events which took place prior to 1 January 1966; and the events that occurred during the normal period covered by the report, 1 January - 30 April 1966. For clarity, certain events may be mentioned in both parts. Detailed information regarding workloads and activities in the aircraft maintenance and supply battalions can be found in the operational reports of the 11th and 765th Transportation Battalions.

PHASE I

3. BACKGROUND:

a. Prior to the 34th General Support Group (AMGS) being formed, all separate aviation companies, aviation battalions, and maintenance battalions were under the 12th Aviation Group in Saigon. Operational control of the aviation operating units was delegated; however, the 12th Aviation Group was assigned complete responsibility for supply and maintenance. In addition, the 12th Aviation Group had the responsibility of supply and

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back-up maintenance for all other Army aircraft in Vietnam. The in-country inventory of US Army aircraft as of July 1965 was approximately 660. These aircraft were supported by the 765th Transportation Battalion at Vung Tau, the 339th Transportation Company at Nha Trang, and the Aircraft Supply Point at Tan Son Nhut Airport in Saigon (Chart #1).

b. Units had been alerted in CONUS for movement to RVN. The 79th Transportation Company (DS) arrived in RVN on 27 August 1965 and was located at Qui Nhon. On 19 September 1965, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 14th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)(GS) and the 540th Transportation Company (AM)(GS) arrived in Vietnam at Cam Ranh Bay. Both the headquarters and the 540th Transportation Company (AM)(GS) were located at Nha Trang; however, the 540th Transportation Company later moved to Qui Nhon. The 335th Transportation Company (DS) arrived in-country on 1 November 1965 and was located at Dong Ba Thin. The 339th Transportation Company (DS) (already in-country and located at Nha Trang), and the 79th Transportation Company (DS) were assigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion by Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group, General Order Number 3, dated 14 October 1965. The 335th Transportation Company (DS) was assigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion by Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group, General Order Number 12, dated 1 December 1965.

c. During this build-up of maintenance and supply support, aircraft were arriving in-country. The increase of aircraft is shown below

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>
July	665
Aug	754
Sept	1325
Oct	1371
Nov	1537
Dec	1595

4. (C) PLANNING:

a. In July 1965, USARV identified the Army aviation logistic problem as one to grow in complexity unless organizational structures were designed to meet the projected increase in the aircraft inventory. The problem specifically centered on the support necessary to accommodate an aircraft population of approximately 2,500 which would be attained between January and June 1966. In recognition of the problem, the Commanding Officer, 12th Aviation Group, was charged with the responsibility to develop a solution to the critical situation which confronted the U. S. Army aviation effort in Vietnam. A study was conducted with objectives: to develop an organizational structure which would

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meet the ever expanding aircraft population through June 1966; and to determine whether the responsibility for aviation supply and maintenance support should be placed under the 1st Logistical Command or under a separate structure reporting directly to the Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam.

b. The organizational structure envisioned by the planning group consisted of three aircraft maintenance and supply battalions and a depot seaborne battalion. These battalions would be composed of eight transportation aircraft general support companies, three transportation aircraft general support companies and two depot supply companies. Additionally, it was visualized that a general support group (aircraft maintenance and supply (AM&S)) would command and control the various battalions in the organization and be assisted in the management effort by the aviation material management center (AMMC). At this time, USARV gave conceptual approval for the activation of two Aviation Electronics GS Companies (Prov). On 27 August 1965, the organizational concept was approved and the 12th Aviation Group was charged with the responsibility of organizing and implementing the program.

c. In the latter part of September at the CINCPAC Phase 1 add-on Conference, the additional aircraft maintenance and supply battalion, the depot seaborne battalion, plus three FA teams and three FB teams (data processing) were inserted into the JCS document as a requirement for the Army aviation logistic effort in Vietnam. It was envisioned that this organizational structure would satisfy the maintenance and supply requirements generated by an aircraft population that would be in-country by June 1966.

5. PROVISIONAL ORGANIZATION:

a. On 24 November 1965, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, General Support Group, (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Provisional) was formed by Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, General Order Number 1699, dated 22 November 1965.

b. Plans and coordination was made with USARV for immediate fill of key personnel for the Group. Because of the provisional status most of the key personnel came from in-country sources. This method provided quicker fill, and also brought in personnel that were knowledgeable of the situation in RVN. However, the provisional status and non-availability of sufficient personnel from in-country sources imposed severe personnel shortages on the Group Headquarters.

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6. REAL ESTATE:

a. While planning was going on to reorganize and increase the maintenance and supply units, plans were also being made to enlarge the Aircraft Supply Point (ASP) at Tan Son Nhut. Among other things, this required the acquisition of real estate and warehouses.

b. The acquisition of real estate and facilities is one of the most perplexing problems encountered within the Republic of Vietnam. No land can be occupied without prior written approval of the Vietnamese Joint High Command. Permission normally requires a minimum of six weeks to three months and often requests must be submitted over and over again.

c. The area required for expansion of the depot for Army aviation parts support within Vietnam was originally requested in 1963. This request bounced back and forth until final approval was received for the use of this land in November 1964.

d. Upon being granted land approval, construction was started on additional storage space. This consisted of building three jumbo quonset warehouses. Two of the quonsets were 40 feet wide by 100 feet long and one 40 feet wide by 200 feet long. In addition two warehouses were scheduled to be completed in February 1966.

e. The original plan became out dated with the planned input of aircraft. A survey and a study were made in September 1965 projecting known requirements as well as future requirements. From this a plan was then developed outlining and setting forth area and building requirements to provide a complete warehouse complex - consisting of both covered and open storage and an administration building for the aviation materiel management center.

f. In October 1965, a real estate request was submitted for sufficient real estate on Tan Son Nhut to establish a ramp and open storage area 600 by 1000 feet with taxiway access to the airfield. After many conferences between representatives of this headquarters and representatives of United States Air Force, an area 394 by 610 feet was given to establish this portion of the Aircraft Supply Point.

g. Upon receiving final approval, funds were allocated and design and construction directives were issued with construction scheduled to commence in early February 1966 and to be completed in June 1966.

h. At the same time the request was submitted for the ramp and storage area, a request was submitted for additional space to the east of the present large warehouse. This area was to be utilized for the

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construction of an additional 120 feet by 200 feet warehouse in the south-east portion and avionics building in the northeast portion. Additionally, real estate was approved on the west side for construction of a fourth warehouse and the AMMC building. (Chart #2)

7. AVIATION MATERIEL MANAGEMENT CENTER (AMMC):

a. While planning was underway, the ASP was operating under severely crowded conditions at Tan Son Nhut and was maintaining a stock of about 15,000 line items. As part of the overall planning, a concept for managing both supply and maintenance as an integrated activity took form and developed in a proposal for the establishment of an organization called the Aviation Materiel Management Center. This organization, to be a part of the General Support Group, would be used to tie maintenance and supply, to include avionics and air armament, effort together for both performance and requirements. TAERS data, aircraft inventory control, configuration control, materiel requirements, and stock control and accounting were the major areas to be centralized for better management of assets in-country. A request was forwarded through channels for approval of this organization.

b. In this same time frame, plans and actions were being taken to transfer avionic and air armament maintenance and supply support to the General Support Group. It was felt that by consolidating support of the complete aircraft system under one group a more responsive system for support would result.

c. A warehouse team from USAAMC made a study of space requirements and utilization during December and January. They also wrote interim warehouse procedures, conducted classes in warehousing, and drew up planographs for the new buildings and open storage area. Based on their study, action was taken to obtain sufficient bins and material to properly utilize space in the new warehouse. AMC and USAAVCOM gave assistance in procurement of bins while pallet racks and dexion material was requested through 1st Logistical Command for purchase in Japan.

PHASE II

8. MISSION: The mission of the Headquarters, 34th General Support Group (AM&S) is to provide command and control of assigned and attached combat service support units performing the aircraft maintenance and support mission in Vietnam.

9. ORGANIZATION:

a. General Order Number 6, Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, dated 17 January 1966, established Headquarters and Headquarters

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Company, 34th General Support Group under TOE 29-102F as modified (Inclosure 1). To facilitate operations, the internal arrangement of the headquarters was organized under functional lines as shown in Chart 3.

b. Effective 24 January 1966, General Order Number 1008, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 12 February 1966, placed the 14th Transportation Battalion and the 765th Transportation Battalion, with their assigned companies, under control of the 34th Group. The 14th Transportation Battalion had the responsibility for aircraft maintenance and supply support in the I and II Corps and the 765th Transportation Battalion had this responsibility for the III and IV Corps. The units that were under the group at this time are shown in Chart 4.

c. The support capability of the 34th General Support Group kept pace and, in fact, lead the build-up of aircraft. The 241st Transportation Company (Depot Supply) arrived at Dong Ba Thin in February 1966 and was assigned to the 34th Group by General Order Number 121, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, dated 21 February 1966, and was further assigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion by General Order Number 11, Headquarters, 34th General Support Group, dated 8 April 1966. Facilities at Dong Ba Thin were not ready for this company. To gain the most from this unit, about 1/3 of the company was attached to the Aviation Material Management Center (AMMC) in Saigon; 1/3 of the company received OJT with the 14th Transportation Battalion; and the remainder of the company started working on improving their area at Dong Ba Thin.

d. The AMMC was organized provisionally from in-country resources and assigned to the 34th Group on 26 February 1966 by General Order Number 1314, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, dated 26 February 1966.

e. In March an Aviation Electronics Support Company (Provisional) (South) and an Aviation Support Company (Provisional) (North) were formed in-country and assigned to the 34th Group by General Order Number 1397, Headquarters, USARV, dated 2 March 1966, with an effective date of 18 March 1966. The North Company was assigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion and located at Nha Trang, and the South Company was assigned to the 765th Transportation Battalion and located at Vung Tau. These assignments were directed by General Order Number 6, Headquarters, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), dated 7 March 1966. Also during March, the 604th and 605th Trans. Companies (DS) arrived in-country and were assigned to the 34th Group by General Order Number 1825, United States Army, Vietnam, dated 25 March 1966. The 604th Transportation (DS) was assigned to the 14th Transportation Battalion and located at Pleiku. The 605th Transportation Company (DS) was assigned to the 765th Transportation Battalion and located at Phu Loi. These moves were directed by General Order Number 9, Headquarters, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), dated 29 March 1966.

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f. In April the 1st Transportation Battalion (Depot) (Seaborne) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay aboard the USNS Corpus Christi Bay. Message, unclassified cite, DA 745903, from ADCSLOG, dated 4 January 1966, placed the 1st Transportation Battalion under operational control of GINCUSARPAC for subsequent transfer for operational control to USARV on arrival in-country. This headquarters has received no other information or orders placing this battalion under operational control of USARV; however, in actual operation, this unit is functioning under the 34th Group as though it were, in fact, under operational control of the Group. This battalion was followed shortly by the 58th Transportation Battalion, which was assigned to the 34th Group by General Order Number 2346 dated 19 April 1966, USARV. The AMMC was assigned to the 58th Transportation Battalion by General Order Number 11, Headquarters, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), dated 8 April 1966. The 110th and 241st Transportation Companies (Depot Supply) were attached to the 58th Transportation Battalion by General Order Number 11, Headquarters, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), dated 8 April 1966.

g. The organization of the 34th General Support Group at the end of April is shown in Chart 5. The disposition of the 34th Group is shown in Chart 6.

10. PERSONNEL:

a. Initially the Group Headquarters, suffered from lack of personnel. At the same time that personnel were being assigned to the Headquarters, the Group was operational, even though marginally so in certain areas.

b. The strength posture for the entire Group and critical personnel shortages are shown in inclosure 2.

11. AVIATION MATERIEL MANAGEMENT CENTER:

a. After the AMMC received provisional status in February, 44 of the planned spaces were to be filled by USARV. Certain spaces from the 14th and 765th Transportation Battalion were made available to AMMC; however, the key management spaces were still vacant. The AMMC was struggling to manage and support a growing number of Army aircraft (660 in August 1965 - 1600^{1/2} December 1965) with inadequate personnel and facilities.

b. Plans were also being made to go from manual to machine operation during this time frame. USAVCOM was requested to send a team over to help with the conversion. Machines were requested and approved; however, lack of operators and programmers prevented much accomplishment in this area.

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Failure of some equipment, such as 026 Key Punches, to arrive on schedule, also effected basic transition toward complete machine operation.

c. A Materiel Requirement Branch was established in AMMC during January to start forecasting and managing air items instead of working strictly on demand history. First items placed under control of this branch were 111 critical, high dollar value items which were causing approximately 30% of the EDP's in USARV. Plans were made to expand this branch into separate commodity managers for major systems in the future.

d. By the end of January the following status existed:

(1) Two new warehouses were nearing completion.

(2) Consolidation of all outside storage items in the new outside storage area was progressing well.

(3) Problems were being encountered in expediting delivery of storage bins from the states.

(4) No firm date had been established as to when avionics and armament air items would be transferred. March 15, 1966 was the planning date.

(5) The Materiel Requirements Branch had been established on a limited scale.

(6) Conversion to machine operation was virtually at a stand still due to equipment and personnel shortages.

(7) All non-divisional aircraft maintenance and supply activities above Transportation Detachment level had been consolidated under the General Support Group (AMG-S) (Prov).

(8) Additional warehouse space and an office building for the AMMC was being held up for lack of approval of real estate space on Tan Son Nhut Airfield.

(9) Common user transceiver network had not been completed nor had the closed circuit teletype net. Also, due to delays in receipt of 026 Key Punches, none had been placed in the DSU's.

(10) Dexion and pallet rack procurement in Japan was being accomplished, however, no delivery dates have been established.

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e. A request was submitted for a separate transceiver network for aircraft supply. This was disapproved due to the extensive common user net being installed which should handle all traffic. Plans were then made to install a closed loop teletype circuit between the AMMC and direct support companies to be used for high priority traffic. Plans were also made to place 026 key Punches at each direct support company. Two people were brought in from each maintenance battalion to start training during this period. These people, in turn, were to instruct their respective DSU's.

f. During the early part of February, consolidation of the outside storage site was completed. The new area was unimproved and requests were submitted for surfacing and construction of a taxiway to facilitate shipping and receiving. Lack of hard stand for outside storage promised to be a major problem during the rainy season.

g. Bins, as programmed for by AMC and USAAVCOM, ran into a funding problem. Through many TWX's and phone calls, this was finally resolved. Although 1156 bins were requested to be air-lifted from CONUS to alleviate the critical storage condition, only 286 bins were moved by this means. The rest, for a total of 1618, were scheduled for sea movement. The first ship carrying a portion of these bins docked 21 April 1966. These bins are presently being assembled. Initially, receipt of new items kept pace with construction of new bins, thus not allowing for draw down on bins already containing multiple items. The stockage list increased from approximately 13,000 to 18,000 items during this period.

h. Approval was obtained for construction of two more large warehouses, plus a two story building to house the AMMC. The warehouses are scheduled to arrive in country during May 66. Approval has been obtained for necessary real estate on which to construct these buildings. The starting date on this construction is not firm. Surfacing of the open storage area and taxiway to include fencing and lighting, is scheduled to begin 1 May 1966; however, a possible delay may be encountered due to higher priorities because of certain unit moves planned for the Saigon area.

i. Conversion from manual stock records to machine operation was completed during this period with the help of three representatives from USAAVCOM. A daily transaction register is now being made with the exception of Sunday since the Vietnamese girls who off-set cards do not work seven days a week. Due to the intensive planning and war gaming, very few errors were introduced and transition went smoothly. Initially, due-outs were not established; however, this was established the latter part of April. Still to be implemented are procedures to effect partial releases and assure safety controls. Also, warehouse locations have

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not been placed on availability balance cards and can not be completed in the near future due to rewarehouseing.

j. During this time frame, changes were initiated to permit direct support companies to be requisitioners in accordance with AR 725-50. Previous to this period, the AMMC was the only out-of-country requisitioner for aircraft repair parts. To implement this procedure, requests were submitted through USARV G4 and MACV Traffic Management Agency to have all AT8 numbers for aircraft direct support units included in the DOD Activity Directory. In addition, coordination was effected with Okinawa and other agencies concerned so that the AT8 numbers would be accepted. By implementing this procedure, better control was established on shipment of parts along with a more expeditious procedure on follow-up on unit requests. Problems existing at the end of period are mainly in the area of new direct support companies entering the theater and their AT8 numbers not yet entered in the DOD Activity Directory.

k. The management section of the AMMC was enlarged during the period, allowing for a more responsive action on parts shortages. The 58th Transportation Battalion Headquarters was diverted to Saigon and given the mission of commanding the AMMC. A maintenance division was started whereby procedures and control were established for centralized management of inputs to Air Vietnam and the Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility. Expansion of this is planned to include closer control of component repair at the general support level. The aim in this area is to program items required for repair country wide.

l. Plans were finalized to assume the supply support mission for avionic and armament items effective 1 May. Although coordination was made with 1st Logistical Command to transfer stocks over to the AMMC prior to this date, none were received as of close of the period. Ninety-six per cent of the armament items and seventy-five per cent of the avionics items that had been placed on the AMMC's ASL were at zero balance. Stocks that were on hand resulted from receipts received on requisitions that had been submitted by the AMMC in anticipation of assuming this mission.

m. Red Ball Express was initiated in the early part of December 1965 to provide priority air delivery of aircraft EDP parts from the CONUS to Vietnam. During December 2138 Red Ball requisitions were submitted with 1519 of these filled. The program rapidly picked up speed and as of 30 April 1966, there had been 8477 Red Ball Express requisitions submitted with 7945 of these filled.

n. During this period "Freddy the Freeloader" was moving priority repair parts from the Aviation Materiel Management Center to direct support units throughout Vietnam. As an example, during January 1966, the Freeloader CV-2's moved 308,223 pounds of cargo and in April

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they moved 251,026 pounds of cargo. A total of 1,221,527 pounds were air lifted by the Freighter outbound from the AMMC during the first four months (January through April) of this calendar year.

o. Aviation Materiel Management Center was busy processing requisitions for repair parts during this period of growth and an increasing aircraft inventory. The following figures indicate the number of requisitions received during each month.

<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u april<="" u=""></u>
33,241	30,717	39,641	31,354	36,585

p. The request for approval of the AMMC ran into a bottleneck at USARPAC. Initially, that Headquarters felt that Army Aviation was attempting to set up a separate supply system and, in general, AMMC was not understood. By use of a liaison officer from Group to USARPAC, all misunderstandings were cleared up and a message was dispatched from CINCUSARPAC to DA requesting the spaces, and the authority to establish the AMMC in Vietnam.

q. The three FA/FB EAM teams were approved; however, DA expects no fill on these until sometime in August. To help relieve some of these requirementam requests were submitted for contract personnel to be brought in-country. Approval was obtained on this, and a message was dispatched by USARYIS requesting Dynaelectron to furnish a total of 51 personnel. Sixteen of these are to work with the Avionics Electronic Companies with the remainder working at the AMMC. The date these people will arrive is unknown.

12. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE:

a. The aircraft maintenance division of 34th Group is charged with the responsibility for providing staff supervision over the maintenance support effort of the attached battalions. In addition, the aircraft maintenance division is responsible for control over transfer of aircraft, technical assistance program, and the EIR program. As a number of this division's personnel are presently working in AMMC, certain aspects of its functions are not effective.

b. Even with the rapid increase in the number of aircraft in RVN, the Group has had no significant problems providing adequate maintenance support except in the case of sheet metal. The high number of crash damage and battle damage repairs require unusual amounts of sheet metal airframe structural repairs. It was found that these requirements could not be met because of extreme personnel shortages in the airframe MOS and action was taken to provide augmentation by contract. This augmentation was provided in two ways: Dynaelectron field contract teams were furnished directly to the two assigned general support units; and

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crash damage aircraft were inducted to Air Vietnam. Dynalectron capability to provide skilled personnel for immediate requirements will also be used to provide personnel to accomplish an extensive modification program (self-sealing fuel tanks) on CV-2B aircraft. Currently, 57 personnel from Dynalectron are now working in South Vietnam; Air Vietnam; the other maintenance augmentation, is a fixed base aircraft repair facility located in Saigon and is capable of accomplishing organizational, direct support, and depot maintenance on all types of Army aircraft assigned in RVN. The Army Contract with Air Vietnam is for 100,000 man hours per year.

c. The following specific significant events occurred during this period which were coordinated by the maintenance division:

(1) Aircraft maintenance float regulation USARV 725-14 was completed for publication. The purpose of this regulation was to establish procedures for issuing of aircraft to using units which are required to evacuate aircraft to direct and general support maintenance units for extensive maintenance. Under this procedure any unit that has an aircraft which is to be in maintenance for seven days or more can have a float issued to replace it. If the aircraft is in maintenance for over 30 days and attrition aircraft are available, action will be taken to transfer an aircraft to the unit. Effectiveness of this program is reduced because of shortage in maintenance float aircraft.

(2) Disposition of crash damaged aircraft USARV Regulation 750-16 is in draft form. This Regulation will establish the procedures to be used for evacuation of crash damaged aircraft from the using unit until either the aircraft is salvaged, repaired in-country, or shipped to CONUS for depot repair. It will serve to clarify existing procedures and eliminate some established practices that are not in the best interest of the aircraft maintenance program.

(3) Depot stock regulation is being staffed for publication. This regulation is required to establish procedures and responsibilities necessary to evacuate flyable aircraft to CONUS for programmed IROAN (Inspect; Repair only as necessary). This program's purpose is to modernize the older aircraft and reduce the maintenance requirements in the theater. The program has been established on a limited scale with O-1's, U-1's, and U-6's, on a direct exchange by using air movement directly from ARADMAC, Corpus Christi to RVN and return direct to Corpus Christi.

(4) UH-1B aircraft incorporating the 540 rotor system were introduced into the theater. The basic differences between the 540 and the standard UH-1B is found in the rotor head. The rotor head has been completely redesigned in an effort to simplify the maintenance

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and increase the over all performance of the airframe. The production of UH-1B with the standard rotor system has been discontinued.

(5) The aircraft inventory has been completely reviewed, and a system set up to run the inventory under EAM procedures. Procedures necessary to implement this system have been published. One critical area of difficulty is the communication of data from using units to the central control point.

(6) DA 1352 Aircraft Status and Flying Time report is consolidated at 34th General Support Group. Formerly this was accomplished manually, requiring four full time typists for approximately four days. Now the report is being consolidated using EAM procedures. Using EAM, it is hoped that a reduction in time spent will allow the report to be submitted earlier. This document forms the basic planning guide for all aviation activities in South Vietnam.

(7) Control of in-country aircraft oriented field service representatives was established which will allow increased utilization of these personnel. A complete program review for FY 67 was completed with changes requested in areas not covered and areas which no longer required representation. Representatives now assigned to separate units are being reassigned to more central locations to enable wider coverage. Technical representative's reports are being reviewed and analyzed in detail prior to forwarding, so that action can be initiated locally to correct conditions noted by the Field Service Representatives.

(8) A critical EIR file has been established for all aircraft in South Vietnam. Analysis of EIRs submitted from South Vietnam on Army Aircraft had not been possible due to the filing procedure. The procedure now in existence allows a rapid analysis of failure rates and to date action has been taken on several items which have begun to show trends.

(9) Technical assistance by a team from US Army Aviation Material Command was received on R-2000 Pratt & Whitney radial engines installed on CV-2B aircraft. The results of the visit pointed out that numerous operational problems existed and numerous maintenance procedures were not being followed. A request has been forwarded to obtain a full time Field Service Representative to assist using units on problems found.

d. Aircraft that are presently being supported supported by Group are depicted in Chart 7.

e. The flying hours supported by type aircraft is shown in Chart 8.

f. In addition to the maintenance support organic to the Group, a

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transportation detachment is assigned to each of the non-divisional aviation companies with the exception of the OV-1 Company (This unit has a limited DS capability in its TOE). Each transportation detachment is staffed and equipped to provide a limited direct support capability. In RVN, the detachment commander is assigned to and under full operational control of the supported company commander. The employment of these detachments varies slightly throughout RVN, but, in most cases, the detachment performs substantially all of the maintenance for the unit except for the daily inspection. Depending upon resources, some intermediate inspections are performed by the integral service platoon of each aviation company. Regardless of the exact operational structure, the results in terms of quality and quantity of work performed are gratifying, and increased utilization of quick change assemblies effectively reduces the downtime on aircraft. The activities of the transportation detachments are monitored and coordinated by the assigned aviation battalion maintenance officer. This control does not interfere with the direct communications link between the detachment and assigned direct support company.

13. SIGNAL:

a. Avionics

(1) The primary Signal area of interest during this period was direct and general support maintenance for aviation electronics. Prior to activation of the provisional Aviation Electronics General Support Companies, direct support was provided through the Signal Detachments (Avionics) which were attached to the airmobile companies; direct support for aviation units not having organic avionics capability was provided through personal coordination with nearby Signal Detachments. General support was non-existent except through consolidation of Signal Detachments which happened to be co-located at any given airfield, and assigning them a general support role.

(2) Approval by USARV of the plan to transfer avionics supply function from 1st Logistical Command to the 34th General Support Group and for the activation of two Aviation Electronics General Support Companies (Prov) required extensive planning and coordination. In these plans, availability of certain requirements was specified as necessary prior to the transfer of functions. These included availability of:

- (a) Sufficient personnel
- (b) Adequate building space
- (c) Certain resources (visible file cabinets, storage bins, etc.).

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(3) Preparations were made to accept the supply function at AMMC, to include identification of items to be transferred, assignment of personnel (from within the limited resources available), and requests for air shipment of visible files and related equipment from CONUS. Initial target date was 15 March 1966.

(4) In March, the two Aviation Electronics General Support Companies (Prov) were activated. Each Company is authorized 8 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 133 enlisted men. Personnel fill of these companies has been slow; however, operational status has been achieved. Organization, construction of supply facilities, fill of authorized stockage lists at the AMMC and personnel fill are the major problems.

b. Communications:

(1) The basic requirements for communications during the first few months were to provide sufficient telephone lines for adequate operation and to provide a radio station for the HF SSB communications which connects the Group Headquarters and its assigned battalions.

(2) Approximately 1 March, the Signal Division took over as net control station for the HF SSB net. Subscriber stations at the time were the 765th Battalion Headquarters and 14th Battalion Headquarters. Since that time the 1st Transportation Battalion (Seaborne) has become a subscriber to the net.

(3) The internal communications requirements for this Group continue to be in excess of the available communications personnel. Fill has been slow, and the need for communications has been immediate. As a result, communications personnel have been borrowed from subordinate units; unskilled personnel have been given on-the-job training; and minimum essential communications have been maintained.

(4) Common-user communications including telephone, teletype, and data transceiver, have not been available in sufficient quantity within the required time frame. The status of these communications facilities is as shown below:

(a) Telephone: Group Headquarters has a total of 11 telephone loops. Based on traffic load, the number of functions performed, the number and dispersion of aviation units served, and the high precedence of the information which is exchanged, at least 20 telephone loops (TOTAL) are required. Additional cable construction has been approved, but installation is being reconsidered in view of a possible movement of this headquarters.

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(b) Teletype: Multi-point teletype loops have been requested and approved to interconnect aircraft DSU's with the AMMC. These circuits have been divided into two loops, one connecting the elements in the southern area (Vung Tau, Phu Loi, and Tan Son Nhut) with the AMMC and the other loop connecting the northern stations (Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Dong Ba Thin) with the AMMC. The southern loop has been operational for some time. The northern loop has never been operational. USARV has assigned a project officer to follow through on this circuit. These teletype loops are badly needed for lateral searches between DSU's and the AMMC, to locate and direct distribution of EDP items.

(c) Transceiver: USARV has planned and engineered a common-user data transceiver network which will have stations located at or near most of our DSU's. The bulk of our requisitions, advices, etc. will be passed over this data system using cards pre-punched at the DSU's. It is expected that two of the stations will be operational within the next two weeks. All of the stations should be operational by end of FY 66.

14. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT:

a. Prior to the 34th Group assumption of the aircraft armament maintenance and supply missions, the customer was required to go directly to the aircraft armament shop at the Rice Mill in Saigon. This was the only existing armament repair shop in Vietnam.

b. This practice created the following problem area.

(1) Complete centralization of the aircraft armament repair in a location that was difficult to reach.

(2) The aircraft armament repair men assigned to direct and general support units were not utilized in their MOS.

(3) The supporting units had little or no demand for aircraft armament repair parts; therefore, their ASL of air armament repair parts was at a low level.

c. The responsibility for aircraft armament maintenance and supply support will be assumed by the 34th Group on 1 May 1966. Close supervision by the maintenance battalions and Group can rectify the problems listed above; however, time will be required to build up stock at the DSU's and AMMC. The present policy (Phase I) is to establish the air armament shops within the two transportation companies (GS) (Vung Tau and Qui Nhon). In Phase II air armament shops will be added to the seven transportation companies (DS).

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d. A request was submitted to CONUS to have aircraft armament subsystem kit packed in one package; however, some kits are still arriving in RVN in separate containers. The delays experienced in installing these sub-systems amounts to two or three weeks awaiting other components to arrive. In some instances, during an extensive search involving many man-hours, it is possible to locate these components in-country. Since most of these sub-systems are airlifted to RVN, there is the ever present possibility of the components being separated for the following reasons:

(1) Difference in the priorities of air-shipments.

(2) Delay due to aircraft mechanical difficulties and crew rest.

(3) Small component items are easily misplaced.

15. TRAINING:

a. From the 34th Group's view point, the most significant aspect of training has been realized through the Army Aircraft Mobile Technical Assistance Program. At present there are five classes in session: UH-1 airframe; CH-47 airframe; CV-2 airframe; T-53 gas turbine engine; and the T-55 gas turbine engine.

b. A breakdown of the classes shows the following results:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DATE STARTED</u>	<u>CLASS SIZE</u>	<u>LENGTH</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS GRADUATED</u>
UH-1	19 April 1965	21	2 Weeks	543
CH-47	11 October 1965	20	3 Weeks	143
CV-2	4 April 1966	11	3 Weeks	11
T-53	19 April 1965	11	2 Weeks	303
T-55	11 October 1965	10	2 Weeks	154
TOTAL				1,154

c. With the exception of the CV-2 class, all of the classes are located in villas in Saigon. The facilities are inadequate and new buildings are in the process of being constructed at Vung Tau. Here, again, the problem of securing real estate was met. A request that started in January was finally approved in April. This school initially will consist of six 20x48 feet quonsets divided in the center, thus making a total of twelve classrooms 20x24 feet. Billets are to consist of tents on a concrete slab. Eight slabs have been poured for this purpose. Some difficulty was encountered in getting the quonsets released, but all problems were

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overcome and two quonsets were being constructed as of 29 April with completion to be 1 June. Some additional difficulty was encountered in obtaining materiels, but most critical materiels were procured in Saigon and sent to Vung Tau. It is anticipated that the move to Vung Tau will be completed by 30 June 1966.

d. To meet the influx of aircraft and, hence, the need for aircraft mechanics, a request was submitted to double all the classes except the CV-2 class. Tentatively, this increase in instruction is to be effective shortly after 1 July 1966.

16. SUMMARY:

a. Much has been accomplished by the end of April. The Group Headquarters is now a TOE unit and has received fill inmost of its key positions. A larger and better building was located and the Group moved into its new building in March 1966. Repairs have continued on the building through the close of this report.

b. About the same time as the Group made its move, office equipment and supplies started to arrive. This included desk, chairs, filing cabinets and vehicles.

c. The problem of motor vehicle availability has, for the most part, been solved. The problems of maintenance facilities and real estate for the consolidated motor pool (Group Headquarters, 58th Transportation Battalion, and AMMC) still remain.

d. Forming in-country in the middle of the rapid build-up of forces, the Headquarters Company had its share of problem. Like all other units it was short of everything. Requisitions were submitted for all required and/or authorized equipment; however, this unit is still short much of its TOE.

e. The Group kept itself operational during its own growth as well as keeping abreast of the maintenance and supply as the number of aircraft and units increased. This is attested to by the high percentage of operational ready aircraft and the large number of flying hours supported.

f. The TOE does not provide any organic aircraft in the Headquarters. To enable the commander and staff to visit organic and supported units, aircraft must be readily available for these units are throughout RVN.

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SECTION II

17. COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That proper logistical planning be accomplished well in advance of increase in density and type of equipment.
- b. That sufficient trained personnel be made available to a unit when mission is assigned to preclude backlogs and errors which require months and many wasted manhours to correct.
- c. That facilities, to include office space and storage space, be made immediately available to AMMC to accommodate mission assignment to preclude crowded conditions, excessive relocation of stocks, and inefficient storage which waste the critically short manpower available.
- d. That the TD for the AMMC be approved by the Department of the Army as soon as possible.
- e. That immediate action be taken to provide the personnel to fill the spaces for the approved TD (AMMC)
- f. That continued efforts be made to consolidate maintenance and operational reports is an effort to reduce the number of reports that present the same information.
- g. That increased efforts be made to establish an inspection program (Maintenance and Supply) for all aviation units.
- h. That coordination be effected with ECOM to insure timely delivery of necessary equipment to alleviate current avionic maintenance float shortages.
- i. That sufficient personnel be assigned to the AMMC to handle the consolidation of avionics repairables for shipment to CONUS.
- j. That personnel shortages of each AvEl Company be filled as expeditiously as possible to insure effective operation of these companies.
- k. That a formal TOE be prepared and approved for these AvEl Companies. TOE will be submitted by this Headquarters.
- l. That continued action, with command attention at all levels, within USARV, be given to complete the transfer of avionics support function from 1st Logistical Command to 34th GS Gp.

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- m. That command support at all levels within USARV be given this centralized management effort of avionics technical assistance personnel.
- n. That command support at all levels within USARV be given to centralized supply and maintenance management of airborne sensory equipment and Mohawk peculiar items.
- o. That all subsystems, be packed complete in one container. If this is not possible because of irregular shape, or size, the components should be banded together and clearly marked with the air armament markings.
- p. That adequate space be made available for establishment of a Group consolidated motor pool.

18. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Planning.

(1) ITEM: Lack of Proper Planning.

(2) DISCUSSION: When the initial decision was made on the build-up of the density and type of aircraft in Vietnam, very little initial planning was accomplished in-country on the details of internal operations of the aircraft supply system. As the build-up progressed, critical conditions developed in many areas. At this time, crash programs had to be initiated to remedy the situation, thus not allowing for detail plans. Bad decisions were made, and being in the business of putting out only big fires prohibited planning for the future. Being behind to start with and with daily operational requirements increasing daily, internal planning again slipped in favor of day to day operations.

(3) OBSERVATION: Planning for large logistical support operations must start well in advance of the implementation date and be in extreme detail to provide the best possible support.

b. Personnel.

(1) ITEM: Shortage of Personnel, AMMC.

(2) DISCUSSION: Without sufficient trained personnel on hand to accomplish the assigned mission, short cuts must be taken which have drastic effects later. In the area of aircraft supply in Vietnam, many required functions could not be performed due to the lack of sufficient trained warehousemen, stock records personnel, EAM operators, and supervisors. This means correct procedures were not established,

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demand data was lost, and improper utilization was made of the limited storage space available. To correct this at a later date, required many additional manhours and in areas such as demand data reconstruction was impossible.

(3) OBSERVATION: Many of the problems existing today in aircraft supply support in Vietnam results from the critical shortage of a sufficient number of qualified personnel assigned in the past. Programming the required trained personnel into a supply unit must be accomplished prior to expanding into a large scale operation supported by an EAM operation. Each area must have personnel ready to assume the required functions, or the overall system will not provide the desired results.

c. Facilities.

(1) ITEM: Crowded Storage Space, AMU

(2) DISCUSSION: Without sufficient storage space available to include necessary openings, multiple items must be stored in the same bin. This means a person trying to find an item wastes valuable manhours looking through a bin for the item and in numerous cases results in lost items. Location of items becomes a problem since a bin becomes full quickly with many items stored in it, thus as more receipts of these items are received, new locations must be established and many manhours wasted in relocation later on.

(3) OBSERVATION: Conditions of overstorage wastes manpower, causes lost items, and does not allow for issue of the oldest item from the shelf first. Sufficient storage areas and bin openings must be planned for and installed prior to receipt of additional stocks.

d. Organization.

(1) ITEM: Aviation Material Management Center.

(2) DISCUSSION: To assist the 34th GSU in managing the logistical support for over 1800 Army Aircraft in RVN, it has been proposed to organize an Aviation Material Management Center (AMMC). The management problems associated with an aircraft population of this magnitude under the environmental conditions encountered in the combat zone, are unprecedented in any like size geographical area of the world. As a result of this huge aircraft population, positive, responsive management becomes a necessity, if the CSARV aviation effort is to succeed. This management effort is preceded by the establishment of the Transportation Aviation Supply Control Agency (TASCA) located in Orleans, France. This agency manages 1000 aircraft with the help of 250 persons and a computer. The

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AMMC will perform the maintenance management functions integrated with the functions of materiel management and supply operations. The AMMC is organized to focus materiel management of all Army aviation systems into one centralized management center. By integrating those functions mentioned above, and by utilizing commodity managers for each aircraft system under centralized control, USARV can be assured of having a responsive aviation logistic system that will maximize the fulfillment of the requirements demanded in support of combat operations.

(3) OBSERVATIONS: In order to provide the logistic support required in accomplishing the above, the necessary personnel spaces are required immediately. As a minimum this should include the 175 spaces previously requested as well as the additional 84 data processing personnel (3 teams FA, 3 teams FB). This request is presently awaiting Department of the Army approval. It is self-evident that the management of over 200 aircraft is a monumental task, and one that needs immediate attention.

e. Organization.

(1) ITEM: Aviation section.

(2) DISCUSSION: The original planning for the Group included an aviation section; however, this section was deleted when the final TOE was approved. As this Headquarters commands units spread over an area that spreads from Saigon, Vung Tau and up to Qui Nhon, a distance of approximately 300 miles, travel must be by air. This requirement is presently being performed by utilizing float aircraft (2 UH-1 helicopters).

(3) OBSERVATION: The need for organic aviation to be readily available to the commander and staff is obvious. A MTOE is being submitted requesting this change.

f. Maintenance.

(1) ITEM: Maintenance augmentation.

(2) DISCUSSION: During period it was learned that adequate sheet metal repair technicians were not available to the theater since backlog in repairing crash damage and battle damage aircraft appeared. This was found at both general support units and effective use of assigned personnel was not capable of reducing the backlog. The following courses of action were considered: request off-shore maintenance; obtain additional military manpower; or attempt to bring in some type of team. Off-shore maintenance was not the answer due to the transportation problem, since many of the aircraft involved had to be transported by water and the airlift was not available to airlift all the aircraft that were air transportable.

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Military manpower increases were not possible because critical shortages in present authorizations continued throughout the period, and many replacements were not trained in the skills required. An existing contract service furnished to the US Air Force from Dynalectron Corporation provided the answer to the problem. This contractor furnished the necessary skilled personnel directly to the site of the repair activity.

(3) OBSERVATION:

(a) Military personnel shortages and lack of trained personnel can be overcome by augmentation of field contract teams.

(b) Civilian contract field teams can provide the necessary skilled personnel who are capable of operating in harmony with a TOE military maintenance organization in a combat zone without difficulty.

(c) Field contract personnel can be utilized in other maintenance and supply operations. Currently, 57 personnel are performing in a superior manner. Immediate response to requests for hard skills will continue to make this type team very attractive to fill gaps in the manpower program in a limited manner

(d). The requirement for airframe repair and personnel in MOS 68G20 has been consistently underestimated in aircraft maintenance units. Action must be initiated to revise existing TOE's, upgrade skill levels and incentives in MOS 68G20, and expedite training output from service schools.

g. (C) Depot Maintenance.

(1) ITEM: Depot maintenance - Return of Aircraft.

(2) DISCUSSION:

(a) During the period a depot maintenance program was initiated with ARADMAC Corpus Christie, Texas. This program began in an effort to modernize the fleet in South Vietnam. October 1965, saw the first of the scheduled return of aircraft. During FY 66, the following aircraft were scheduled:

OV-1	4
U-8	4
O-1	35
CV-2	5
U-1	21
U-6	14

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OH-13	6
CH-47	2

To date, the following aircraft have been applied against the program:

OV-1	1
U-8	3
O-1	34
CV-2	3
U-1	16
U-6	14
OH-13	0
CH-47	0

U-1, O-1, and U-6 Aircraft have been air lifted from South Vietnam directly to Corpus Christie. No major problems have been encountered with this portion of the program. It was soon learned that the larger aircraft would become a problem due to lack of shipping space for water lift.

(b) The theater recommended that a small aircraft carrier be made available to South Vietnam on a periodic basis so that CV-2B's, OV-1, and CH-47 Aircraft could be returned as scheduled. One such carrier was made available in October 1965, and even though it lifted a backlog of aircraft awaiting shipment, sound planning procedures were not used and numerous problems were experienced in getting aircraft to the loading points and further problems encountered in loading out the vessel. Another carrier was again made available in April 1966, at which time adequate planning has assured a complete load with a minimum of problems.

(3) OBSERVATION:

(a) CV-2B, OV-1, and CH-47 Aircraft will require sea lift on a continuing basis to meet depot maintenance schedule. The crash damage and combat damage rate on UH-1 Aircraft will provide adequate aircraft to fill an aircraft carrier once every quarter.

(b) Port facilities for loading aircraft are still primitive; sling loads by heavy lift helicopter provide the only method of loading at both Vung Tau and Qui Nhon.

(c) The Depot Maintenance Program can only succeed if adequate sealift and airlift are made available.

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h. Maintenance Equipment.(1) ITEM: Equipment augmentation.

(2) DISCUSSION: To enable the command to furnish complete maintenance capability, a fuel control test stand was ordered and received during the period. This fuel control testing capability allows the general support maintenance unit to test and repair fuel controls installed on the T-53 and T-55 Turbine Engine manufactured by Lycoming corporation. These items are classed as Hi-Dollar value items, and only the most sophisticated test equipment can service them.

(3) OBSERVATION:

(a) During two months of operations, 98% of all fuel control units have been returned to service.

(b) Continued use of this equipment will result in large savings of money and turn around time since a very few units will have to be returned to CONUS for repair.

i. Equipment Improvement Report.(1) ITEM: E.I.R. Analysis.

(2) DISCUSSION: A master file of all Equipment Improvement Recommendations for all assigned aircraft was not established until April 1966. This is considered an important management tool to determine where additional requirements may be needed in supply and maintenance. The analysis of recent E.I.R.'s have pointed out significant failure trends which now are being monitored closely.

(3) ORSEVATION: That increased management efforts through planned analysis will assist to improve the maintenance and supply posture.

Centralized Point For Management Of Repairables Returned To CONUS.(1) ITEM: Return of avionic repairables.

(2) DISCUSSION: Since early fall of 1965, the Tan Son Nhut Aviation Electronics (AvEl) facility has acted as a centralized point for return of repairables to CONUS. The program as established has been quite effective in that it has allowed the Tan Son Nhut facility to program the input of repairables to Sacramento Army Depot, and has afforded necessary information relative to items shipped, repaired items returned, etc.

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(3) OBSERVATION:

(a) The centralized collection of repairables to CONUS should be continued, but the function should be transferred to the AMMC, Tan Son Nhut, as soon as practicable.

(b) Each AvEl GS company should establish a technical inspection facility to determine suitability of the respective items for return as repairables to CONUS.

k. Centralized Management.

(1) ITEM: Centralized supply and maintenance management of airborne sensory equipment and Mohawk-peculiar items.

(2) DISCUSSION: There is presently no one agency or office in USARV which has detailed information concerning supply and maintenance status and support requirements for all airborne sensory equipment (SLAR, IR, and Camera) and Mohawk-peculiar avionics items. Lateral support among these units is on an informal "hit-or-miss" basis. Utilization of resources within established priorities, identification of problem areas common to the several Mohawk units, and other necessary management actions are not possible.

(3) OBSERVATION: Action is being taken to consolidate centralized supply and maintenance management under the 34th General Support Group, which will provide the Commanding General, USARV with one central source of information and contact for supply and maintenance of these important, low-density equipments.

1. Aviation Electronics Supply Transfer.

(1) ITEM: Transfer of Aviation Electronics Supply from 1st Logistical Command to AMMC.

(2) DISCUSSION: During August 1965, conferences were held to determine the feasibility of this supply transfer. Areas of consideration included the capability of the Aviation Materiel Management Center (AMMC) to provide intensive management of aviation electronics supplies integrated into the aircraft supply system. Initial approval was granted in late August 1965 for this transfer. The initial plan was submitted in late 1965. Conferences were held during January 1966 between elements of the 1st Logistical Command, USARV, and the newly organized 34th General Support Group (AM&S) to establish an orderly, efficient schedule of transfer. Plans were approved 27 January 1966, by Brigade General Norton. General Norton directed the 34th Group to assume responsibility for aviation elec-

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tronics supply within a time frame as detailed in a capabilities plan which called for facilities construction to commence 1 February 1966, with completion of all construction, personnel acquisition, and transfer of supplies not later than 15 March 1966. Delays in construction, problems with acquisition of sufficient personnel to man the aviation electronics portion of the AMIC, and delays within 1st Logistical Command in transferring the avionics supplies, pushed the original completion date back to 30 April 1966. As of 30 April 1966, elements of the 34th Group were prepared to accept this responsibility; however, as of 5 May 1966, only Vung Tau Support Area of the 1st Logistical Command had actually transferred any supplies.

(3) OBSERVATION:

- (a) More specific details and procedures should have been given 1st Logistical Command and 24th General Support Group concerning their respective areas of responsibility in this transfer action.
- (b) Detailed procedures should have been disseminated to all headquarters concerned to alleviate present problems. Much of the direction from USARV concerning this transaction was verbal. More and better guidance from USARV would have alleviated many of the problems which have been encountered.

m.. Maintenance Float.

- (1) ITEM: Inadequacies in maintenance float.

(2) DISCUSSION:

(a) Since July 1965, maintenance float for avionics items has been controlled by the 8th Signal Detachment, Tan Son Nhut. This system, established to control maintenance float assets, has been inadequate due to lack of trained personnel to operate the system. Recently organized AvEl GS Companies will control float equipment within their respective areas of responsibility. Each company is to assign an officer as Float Control Officer, who will be responsible for insuring proper distribution of float stocks to the avionics DS activities. Availability of float stock for the newer items (AN/ARC-51, 54, 102) has been inadequate because production of these equipments has not kept pace with aircraft production. It is anticipated that within the next eight months, production of these avionics items will increase sufficiently to insure adequate float stockage in RVN. Introduction of other new equipment, such as the AN/AFH-82, AN/ARN-83, AN/ASN-64, will continue to complicate the float situation; production schedules call for operational, installed equipment first, with maintenance float as a lower priority item.

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(b) Another serious problem area is the lack of aircraft maintenance floats. Having aircraft available for maintenance floats enables the operating aviation units to perform their mission with the required number of aircraft. Aviation units cannot afford to have their aircraft down for extensive maintenance without a replacement aircraft.

(3) OBSERVATION:

(a) It is mandatory that the limited float stock available to support in-country AvEI assets be intensively managed.

(b) Aircraft maintenance floats must be available to issue to the aviation units when required.

n. Requirement For Aviation Electronics General Support Maintenance And Supply Support.

(1) ITEM: Provision of an aviation electronics general support maintenance and supply system.

(2) DISCUSSION A requirement for avionics maintenance and supply facility integrated with the aircraft maintenance and supply system has become apparent with the influx of Army aircraft into Vietnam. This requirement was recognized as early as August 1965. In late 1965 USARV directed the 34th General Support Group (AM&S) to submit plans for the activation of a General Support Avionics system with general support maintenance and supply capability. The system was to be based on geographical areas of responsibility rather than specific units of assignment. This was accomplished by using 15 each 11-500D TOE teams (RL) as support packets for two Aviation Electronics Support Companies. In addition, the avionics personnel, to include Signal supply specialists, from the aircraft DS and GS companies were transferred to these two provisional companies. Additional personnel and equipment came from the avionics assets of the 128th Signal Company, a Signal Depot Maintenance Company assigned to 1st Logistical Command. Equipment was obtained from the 15 RL teams and the aircraft DS and GS companies. USARV General Order 1397 dated 6 March 1966 organized the two AvEI Companies. Operational ready date was coincident with the transfer of the avionics supply function to 34th General Support Group. Each company consists of four GS platoons, to be organized at Vung Tau (also Company Headquarters) and Tan Son Nhut, and platoons of the North Company to be organized at Nha Trang (also Company Headquarters) and Qui Nhon. Phase II will include platoons at Soc Trang,

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Phu Loi, Dong Ba Thin and Pleiku. A section of the Qui Nhon Platoon will be activated in phase II at Da Nang.

(3) OBSERVATION: The personnel requirements for the AvEL Companies have not been met. It is imperative that officer and enlisted supply specialists be assigned to these two companies. The 34th General Support Group will continue to monitor the personnel input and the status of operational problems inherent in the activation of these provisional units.

c. Aviation Technical Assistance.

(1) ITEM: Centralized management of avionics technical assistance personnel.

(2) DISCUSSION: The 47 Avionics Technical Assistance Personnel in RVN, representing 18 items of equipment, must service 125 aviation units which are users of equipment. These personnel are assigned to various using units, but with no centralized control over their activities. This current approach to Technical Assistant Personnel results in loose operational control and the inability of these personnel to immediately react to requirements of units other than the one to which they are assigned.

(3) OBSERVATION: AR 750-22, and USARV Circular 750-22 apply. Technical assistance personnel must be assigned and utilized with sufficient flexibility that they may respond to the changing requirements of the supported units in accordance with established priorities. This is not presently the case, although actions are being taken to accomplish this centralization under the 34th General Support Group.

p. Air Armament.

(1) ITEM: Air Armament Sub-systems.

(2) DISCUSSION: The difficulty in transportsations and communications in handling sub-system kits in theatre and the magnitude of getting the aircraft, the people and the kits together at one time requires that the complete sub-system be packaged together.

(3) OBSERVATION: Components of armament subsystem must to be packaged together.

2 Incl.

as


EDWARD L. BURCHELL
Colonel, TC
Commanding




Chart 1: Organization July 1965

REAL ESTATE

SEARCH

<u>SITE FACILITY</u>	<u>SL. #</u>	<u>SL. FT. #</u>	<u>SL. FT. CONST.</u>	<u>ADD SL. FT. #</u>	<u>SO. OF COMM. LD & LAND APPROVED</u>	<u>CONST. ST. RT.</u>	<u>TITLE PLEAS. PLATIS.</u>
OFFICE SPACE M-34 CP GP	10,600	6,000	4,800		1,225	Apr 66	May 66
ARC	20,720	1,058	18,662		20,000	May 66	Dec 66
WAREHOUSES	110,000	64,000	46,000		48,000	May 66	Aug 66
OPEN STORAGE AREA	200,000	0	200,000		240,340	May 66	Aug 66
MOTOR POOL M-34 CP (27)		12,150	0		12,150	0	
MOTOR POOL ARC (55)		24,750	0		24,750	0	




Chart 2




Chart J. Staff Organization

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



CHART 4: Organization
January 1966



SOUTH VIETNAM




Chart 6: Location of Units April 1966

39

**MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
ROTARY WING**

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>FLOAT</u> <u>ON HAND</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
UH-1B	543	55	7	550
UH-1D	555	56	33	588
OH-13S	171	18	18	189
OH-23	21	2	0	21
CH-37	8	1	0	8
CH-47	80	9	7	87
<u>CH-54</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	1382	141	65	1447

**MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
FIXED WING**

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>FLOAT</u> <u>ON HAND</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
O-1	148	15	0	148
OV-1	30	3	1	31
U-1A	36	4	2	38
U-6	63	6	0	63
CV-2	97	10	5	102
<u>U-8D/F</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>39</u>
TOTAL	413	42	8	421

Total All Float Auth -183: On Hand -73

Total All A/C Asgn -1795.

Total All A/C -1868.

Chart 7

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM COMPARISON IN RVN

1965 .

1966

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>
O-1	70	52	58	63	73	67	70	67	76	76	92
U-1	60	54	53	49	54	53	55	60	49	49	73
U-6	50	51	57	39	52	43	45	40	38	38	56
U-8	65	57	45	38	49	43	46	59	53	53	42
OV-1	72	63	76	54	74	50	52	61	53	53	38
CV-2	70	73	67	75	72	72	58	60	66	71	
OH-13S	10	28	53	23	43	39	37	39	32	32	37
OH-23	40								60	55	
UH-1B	60	57	94	38	48	45	43	48	47	56	
UH-1D	60	66	70	36	49	51	47	56	56	65	
CH-37	25	17	12	13	14	14	10	2	12	7	
CH-47	50				20	33	41	25	40	37	33
CH-53	30				19	19	23	39	19	23	29
LOI	50										

Chart 8

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EXTRACT OF INCLOSURE 1 TO GO 6, HQ USARPAC, 1966

TOE

29-102F, 65

(SRC 29 102F 5001)

Less: Para 12, Cryptologistics Sec

Plus: Augmentation, Para 13

(SRC 29 102F 5021)

Br.	MOS Code	Grade	Para	Line	No
Less:	SM 2624	Col	1	1	1
	SM 2624	LtCol	1	2	1
	NC 76K50	E-9	1	3	1
	SM 2162	Maj	3	1	1
	NC 76K50	E-8	3	4	1
	NC 76K40	E-7	3	5	1
	SM 2625	LtCol	4	1	1
	SM 4200	Maj	4	2	1
	SM 4803	Maj	4	3	1
	SM 4803	Capt	4	3	1
	SM 4200	Maj	4	4	1
	SM 4200	Capt	4	4	1
	NC 62B50	E-8	4	9	1
	NC 63250	E-8	4	10	1

Incl #1

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TOE

<u>Br</u>	<u>MOS Code</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>No</u>
NC	76E50	E-8	4	11	1
NC	56C40	E-7	4	15	1
SM	2625	Maj	5	1	1
SM	4815	Capt	5	2	1
SM	4803	Capt	5	3	1
SM	4825	Capt	5	4	1
SM	4201	Capt	5	6	1
NC	63240	E-7	5	7	1
	62B30	E-5	5	9	1
	76K20	E-5 ^{DT}	5	10	1
	31E20	E-5	5	11	1
NO	0200	Lt	8	1	1
NC	72B40	E-5	9	2	1
	72B20	E-6	9	4	1
Plus:	TC 64823	Col	1		1 Commander
	TC 64823	LtCol	1		1 Executive Off
	MC 3160	Maj	1		1 Flight Surgeon
	NC 67250	E-9	1		1 Sgt Major
	64A10	E-3	2		1 Lt Trk Dvr
	TC 64823	LtCol	3		1 Plans Op Off
	TC 64823	Maj	3		1 Op Off

Incl #1

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TOE

Br	MOS Code	Grade	Para	Min No	
Planes	TC 64823	Capt	3		1 Acft Op Off
	NC 67250	E-8	3		1 Op Sgt
	NO 67240	E-7	3		1 Acft Op Svc
	NC 54E40	E-6	3		1 Ops NCO
	71E30	E-6	3		2 Ech Typ
	61A10	E-4	3		1 Gun Draftman
	66A10	E-3	3		1 Lt Ball Drv
	TC 62625	Lt Gun	4		1 Air Log Off
	TC 62625	Maj	4		1 Air Log Off
	NO 67422	Maj	4		1 Air Safety Off
	TC 64823	Maj	4		1 Acft Maint Off
	TC 64823	Capt	4		2 Acft Maint Off
	SC 64415	Maj	4		1 Sp Sig Off
	TO 4474	Capt	4		2 Acft Sup Off
	OD 4808	Maj	4		1 Acft Armament Off
	671B	WO	4		3 Acft Repair Tech
	NO 286A	WO	4		1 Elect Rep Tech
Planes	NC 67250	E-8	4		1 Acft Rep Chief
	NC 67240	E-7	4		1 Acft Acft Rep Ch
	NO 76H50	E-8	4		1 Trans Sup/Prte Sp
	67F20	E-6	4		3 Arpl Tech Insp

Incl #1

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TOE

<u>Br</u>	<u>MOS Code</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>No</u>
Plus:					
	67W20	E-6	4		3 Heptr Tech Insp
	71B30	E-4	4		3 Clk Typist
NC	76G40	E-7	5		1 Sig Sup/Prts NCO
NC	76H40	E-6	5		1 Trans Sup/Prts NCO
NO	421A	WO	5		1 Acft Arm Rep Tech
OD	4805	Capt	5		1 Auto Maint Off
NC	76K40	E-7	5		1 Gen Sup Sgt
NC	76D40	E-7	5		1 Ord Sup/Prts Sgt
NC	31Q40	E-7	5		1 Avionics Rep Sgt
NC	31Q40	E-6	5		2 Asst Avionics Rep Sgt
NC	45J40	E-7	5		1 Acft Armament Sgt
NC	45J40	E-6	5		1 Asst Acft Arm Sgt
NO	64413	Capt	6		1 Asst Gp Sig Off
NC	71H40	E-5	13		1 Pers Mgt NCO
NC	71H40	E-5	13		1 Pers Rec Supv
NC	71H40	E-5	13		1 Pers Pay Supv
NC	71R40	E-5	13		1 Pers Action Supv
Plus:	71B30	E-4	13		1 Clk Typist
	71K20	E-4	13		2 Pers Mgt Sp
	71H20	E-4	13		1 Pers Rec Sp
	71B20	E-4	13		1 Reports Clk

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By MOS Code Grade Para Link No

Plus:	71320	E-4	13	1 Pay Sp
	71330	E-4	13	2 Ports Action Sp
	71340	E-3	0	1 General CLK

Authorized Strength:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>ACG</u>
27	7	111	145

Incl #1

PERSONNEL POSTURE AND CRITICAL SHORTAGES

1. 34th General Support Group (AM&S) strength posture was as follows during this period:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Jan	102	45	2138	74	44	1790
Feb	111	45	2279	96	45	2003
Mar	139	55	2915	126	59	2584
Apr	173	75	3225	167	70	2883

2. Critical enlisted personnel shortages (as of 23 April 1966).

MOS	HHC 34TH AUTH/ASG	1ST BN AUTH/ASG	14TH BN AUTH/ASG	58TH & AMMC AUTH/ASG	765TH BN AUTH/ASG	SHORTAGE
64A10	2/1	*	12/13	0/0	9/2	7
68G20	0/0	*	93/64	0/0	81/58	52
56B20	1/1	*	39/10	-	0/0	36
68B20	0/0	*	72/44	0/0	38/50	48
67T30	0/0	*	98/27	0/0	49/7	113
71R20	5/6	*	42/16	7/8	29/21	32
45J20	0/0	*	39/22	0/0	32/32	17
31Q30	0/0	*	66/53	0/0	50/44	9
67W20	3/2	*	43/28	2/1	24/21	20
76H20	0/1	*	82/51	1/0	24/26	29
76A10	0/3	*	67/25	0/0	31/17	53

* Personnel support directly from CONUS (AMC).

3. Officer personnel shortages (as of 30 April 1966)

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 34TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP (AM&S)

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
MAJ	3160	Flight Surgeon
MAJ	62625	Safety Officer
CAPT	9301	Intelligence Officer
CAPT	57314	RASC Officer
WO	671B	Aer Repair Tech
WO	671B	Aer Repair Tech

14TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
LT	4415	Signal Detachment Command
LT	4474	Acf Supply Officer
LT	4415	Detachment Commander
LT	64823	Acf Maint Officer
LT	64823	Acf Maint Officer
LT	64823	Acf Maint Officer
WO	671CO	Quality Control Tech
WO	671CO	Quality Control Tech

765TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
CAPT	5310	Chaplain
LT	0200	Communication Officer
LT	4823	Asst Maint Off
LT	4474	Co Executive Officer
LT	4474	Stock Issue Officer
LT	4415	Detachment Commander
WO	062B	Helicopter Pilot
WO	062B	Helicopter Pilot
WO	062B	Helicopter Pilot
WO	671CO	Quality Control Tech

Inclosure #2

AVGS-B (10 May 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: "Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSOP0-28 (RI))"

HEADQUARTERS, 34TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP (AMRS), APO US Forces 96307,
21 May 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Department of the Army (ACSFOR DA), ATTN:
Force Development, Washington, D.C.

1. Format of Section II is incorrect. Change 1, dated 1 April 1966, to USARV Circular Number 870-1 was mailed to the 14th Transportation Battalion on about 10 April 1966. The 14th Transportation Battalion states that the circular was not received; however, this error was found in time to notify the 14th Transportation Battalion of the proper distribution of the report.

2. Except as noted below, this headquarters concurs with this report.

3. Section II, Para 4.

a. USARV Regulation 725-50 on aircraft requisitioning procedures has been approved and is at USARV AG for publication.

b. USARV Regulation (Unk) on stockage levels for aircraft repair parts is at USARV G4 and approval is expected in the near future.

c. USARV program for evacuation of reparables has been published and implementing instruction from this headquarters should be published by 5 June 1966.

d. USARV Regulation 725-1 and 725-3 are under revision but should be followed in the interim as far as assignment of priorities to requisitions and establishment of prescribed load lists.

4. Section II, Para 8.

a. There were no stocks in-country from which the AvEl Companies could requisition supplies. AMMC went in (starting 16 February 1966) for total initial stocks for all avionics supply activities. AvEl Companies have been informed that they may now requisition their ASL's.

b. A supply representative from Philadelphia NICP is TDY with the 34th Group for 60 days to study and recommend improvements in the avionics supply procedure. This will include ASL's at AMMC and general support companies.

2 AVGS-B (10 May 66)

1st Ind

21 May 1966

SUBJECT: "Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSOPD-28 (RI))"

5. Section II Para 7, 9, and 10. A study is being made of necessary avionics maintenance and supply structure for RVN. Inadequacies are known and appreciated by all headquarters concerned and are expected to be corrected by a TOE to be recommended within 45 days.

6. Section II Para 5. A timely distribution of aircraft parts in the I and II Corps Areas continues to be a problem. This headquarters is aware of this problem and is attempting to find a solution.

1 Incl
nc



EDWARD L. BURCHELL
Col, TC
Commanding

600-157